We consider a multi-sector overlapping generations model with oligopolistic firms in the output markets and wage-setting trade unions in the labour markets. A coordination problem between firms creates multiple temporary equilibria which are either Walrasian or of the Keynesian unemployment type. There exist many deterministic and stochastic equilibrium cycles fluctuating between Keynesian recession and Walrasian boom periods with arbitrarily long phases in each regime. The cycles are in accordance with certain empirical regularities. Money is neutral and superneutral, but appropriate countercyclical fiscal policies stabilize the cycles in a textbook Keynesian way.
Introduction
We consider an economy with imperfect competition due to the presence of trade unions in labour market and oligopolistic firms in output markets. The strategic interaction amongst firms produces a novel coordination problem and multiple equilibria; within a dynamic macroeconomic model, this multiplicity leads to endogenous business cycles fluctuating between regimes of Keynesian unemployment and Walrasian full employment. The endogenous cycles are of particular interest compared to existing literature in that they emerge under relatively orthodox fundamentals, they generate stylized facts relating to asymmetry and procyclical vacancies, amongst others, and they may be stabilized by fiscal policies in a standard Keynesian way.
Firms interact by demanding labour at wages previously set by trade unions and producing output (under constant returns) which is sold,à la Cournot, at its marketclearing price. If aggregate labour demand exceeds available supply at the given wage, firms are rationed.
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An individual firm's labour demand will cease to affect aggregate employment, and hence aggregate output or its price, if aggregate labour demand of rival firms by itself exceeds available supply. Thus at high levels of aggregate output, attempts by one firm to change its output by changing its labour demand produce a Walrasian rather than Cournotian price response. In a static, single-sector model we show (Propositions 1 and 2) that there is a range of wages, bounded above by the Walrasian equilibrium wage, within which this strategic interaction amongst firms produces two equilibria, one with low output and Keynesian unemployment (Cournotian response), and one with full employment output and excess vacancies (Walrasian response). Assuming a sunspot signal ("recession" or "boom") resolves the coordination problem, a trade union wishing to maximize worker surplus will choose wages leading to Keynesian unemployment in a recession and Walrasian equilibrium in a boom (Proposition 3).
We then embed this in a fairly orthodox overlapping generations model (constant returns production functions, gross substitutes utility functions) with a large num-1 In a number of models which analyse such a given wage Cournot scenario (most explicitly in d 'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet (1989, 1995) , Kaas (1998) , Schultz (1992) ), it is simply assumed to be infeasible for firms to offer such labour demands. Here we assume instead, as seems at least reasonable with given wages, that excess demands/supplies are rationed according to some well-behaved rationing mechanism. model differs technically from most of the existing literature in that the backward (and forward) dynamics of our model follows a set-valued difference equation (i.e., the right hand side is a correspondence rather than a function), where the selection from the correspondence is dictated by the sunspot series. A large set (an infinity) of deterministic cycles emerges which are all locally determinate (stable in the backward perfect foresight dynamics), as well as nearby stochastic equilibria.
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Our fluctuations are thus very much dependent on "animal spirits". However, a further important novelty of the paper compared with existing endogenous business cycle models is that it is unique in generating, in particular, the asymmetry and procyclical vacancy "stylized facts".
Although money is neutral and superneutral -as in other models of perfect and imperfect competition with rational expectations but without nominal rigiditiesour Keynesian fiscal policy results stand in contrast to other models of the literature in which policy responses are of a more Walrasian nature. Dixon (1987) , Mankiw (1988) and Bénassy (1995) consider general equilibrium models of imperfect competition and find positive balanced-budget multipliers less than one. In their models, the positive effect on output follows from a stimulation of labour supply since a higher tax burden causes a lower demand for leisure, provided that leisure is a normal good.
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Jacobsen and Schultz (1994) consider an overlapping generations model with an imperfectly competitive labour market and show that fiscal policy can only affect output when the public and the private demand elasticities differ. If these elasticities are equal, there is full crowding out since price changes completely offset the increase in aggregate demand. In our model, a higher (lump-sum) tax burden has no effect on labour supply, and prices and wages are unaffected by the fiscal policy during recessions. Therefore, our model has unit multipliers and reproduces the policy result of the seminal article of Hart (1982) in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static, single-sector model which is embedded in Section 3 in a dynamic multi-sector general equilibrium model. 5 Azariadis and Smith (1998) consider a growth model with asymmetric information in the credit market which exhibits also multiple equilibria, set-valued dynamics and an infinity of locally stable cycles fluctuating between two regimes.
6 Similar labour supply effects are also at work in the Walrasian OLG economies of Grandmont (1986) and Aloi, Jacobsen, and Lloyd-Braga (2000) who show that appropriate monetary and fiscal policy rules can stabilize endogenous fluctuations.
Section 4 studies endogenous business cycles under laissez-faire, and Section 5 contains our policy results. Section 6 concludes. All proofs not included in the text are contained in Appendix A.
The static single-sector model
We consider a single sector of an economy in which N price-setting firms produce a homogenous output good from inputs of sector-specific labour. , where ≤ L denotes sector employment and w denotes the sector wage. In this section, the output demand and labour supply functions are exogenously given as described above, but they are derived in the next section from the preferences of consumers in a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model.
We consider a two-stage game between the trade union and the firms which is the equivalent of the conventional "right-to-manage model" for an imperfectly competitive output market. Our rationing mechanism satisfies various standard and desirable properties from the rationing literature (see e.g. Bénassy (1982) ). First, rationing is frictionless, so only one side of the market is rationed, or
, some workers are unemployed and the firms' employment levels are
On the other hand, if there is excess demand for labour, aggregate employment is L and we assume that this is allocated amongst firms via some continuous 7 We focus on a monopolistic union for simplicity, but the model may be generalized to wage bargaining at stage I between the trade union and an employers' federation interested in maximizing the expected profits of its members. → IR + which defines employment constraints for firms so that
(1)
Hence we are assuming that the rationing mechanism is also continuous, symmetric (in that employment constraint functions are identical and symmetric for all firms) and non-manipulable (the employment constraint of each firm does not depend on its own labour demand).
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An important consequence of these assumptions (see Lemma A.1 in the Appendix) is that if N − 1 firms signal the same labour demand (J say) then the remaining firm gets at least the N -th share of labour supply plus the workers who do not find employment at the other firms. That is, the employment constraint facing the remaining firm is
From the labour allocated to firms, firms produce outputs y j = j , and the sector output is then sold at the market clearing price p(y
Hence in the stage II game, firms simultaneously demand labour (J j ) j=1,...,N and make profits π
where employment levels ( j ) j=1,...,N follow from (1). An important feature of this game is that it possesses, for a certain range of wages, multiple Nash equilibria. Consider first an unemployment equilibrium which corresponds to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which firms directly compete in employment/output ignoring the employment constraint. Straightforward calculations show that the Cournot-Nash labour demand is a uniformly elastic function of the sector wage w satisfying
8 The uniform rationing scheme (see Bénassy (1982, Appendix J) ) is an example of a rationing scheme satisfying our assumptions. Non-manipulability is required to rule out unlimited overbidding and to guarantee existence of equilibrium, and symmetry is imposed for the sake of convenience. 9 This price would also be set by firms if firms would set prices simultaneously at a subsequent stage III. Unlike the result of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , this result does not depend on the way consumers' demand is rationed at asymmetric prices (efficient, proportional etc.) and ensures that the Bertrand price setting produces an essentially Cournot outcome whenever demand is uniformly elastic (see Madden (1998) The Cournot-Nash equilibrium with unemployment is not the only equilibrium of the stage II game after the trade union sets some wage w > w
CN
. There may also be an equilibrium in which firms create excess vacancies. Let w WE ≡ p(L) denote the Walrasian wage which is the wage that would prevail if firms were price takers and if the sector output and labour markets were in equilibrium. Obviously, the Walrasian wage exceeds the Cournot-Nash market clearing wage:
, there is an equilibrium of the stage II game in which firms create an excess demand for labour. Specifically suppose that J j = J ≥ L/(N − 1), j = 1, . . . , N , so that the labour demand from any (N − 1) firms exceeds the labour supply at w. Now the employment/output decision of any one firm (say firm 1) has no effect on aggregate employment and output which remain at their full employment levels. Thus, the employment decision of firm 1 does not alter the resulting output price which remains p(L), and therefore firm 1 effectively behaves as a price taker. As a result, firm 1 is willing to expand its demand for labour provided that the wage is less than or equal to the Walrasian wage w 
The relation between the sector wage w and sector employment in the stage II equilibria of Propositions 1 and 2 is illustrated in Figure 1 
The sectoral trade union observes the sunspot state S and anticipates the labour demand behaviour of firms which gives rise to 11 The equilibrium derived in this Proposition is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the twostage game for the two selections of stage II equilibria described by B (w) and R (w). Of course there are many other possible subgame perfect equilibria based on other selections, but these two selection rules are the only ones for which the selection is independent of the sector wage. In a recession state, the union demands a markup over the workers' reservation wage and there is unemployment, provided that the reservation wage is not too low. If w r ≤ (ρ − 1)w CN /ρ, there would be full employment at the Cournot-Nash market clearing wage w = w CN . This case is not relevant for the subsequent analysis, so we neglect it for the ease of exposition.
In a boom state, and if the reservation wage is not too high, the union sets the Walrasian wage, anticipating that this is the highest wage at which firms create excess vacancies and full employment.
12
If w WE < zw r , the equilibrium would be as specified in (a) involving unemployment, but again this case is not relevant for the subsequent analysis.
12 One may wonder why firms do not overbid the union wage when they are on the long side of the market, so as to attract more workers. It is easy to see, however, that they would not do so at the Walrasian wage at which they get zero profits, since any overbidding would incur losses.
The dynamic multi-sector model The economic environment
We consider now a dynamic general equilibrium model in discrete time t = 0, . . . , N comprising a continuum of sectors s ∈ [0, 1], each of which being a copy of the representative sector of the previous section. There are three types of goods: labour, output and fiat money. In every sector s and in every period t, N firms produce the sector output from inputs of sector-specific labour under unit constant returns to scale, and there is a continuum [0, L] of workers represented by a single utilitarian trade union. The sector price, wage, employment and output are denoted p st , w st , st , y st . Workers (consumers) are described by two-period lived overlapping generations who supply labour in the first period of their life and who consume in both lifetime periods. Their labour endowment possesses specific attributes which allows them to be employed only in one sector, but not elsewhere in the economy.
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However, young consumers receive profit income from various sectors (a negligible fraction coming from any one sector) and they consume output goods of all sectors. To finance future consumption, consumers save part of their income as fiat money. Preferences of consumers are represented by the utility function
where c st and c s,t+1 denote consumption of sector s output in period t, t + 1 respectively, ρ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between sector outputs, t ∈ {0, 1} is labour supply, and b ≥ 0 is disutility of work. u is assumed to be twice differentiable, strictly quasi-concave, strictly monotone, homogenous of degree one, and such that indifference curves do not cut the axes.
There is a government that consumes output goods, levies a lump-sum tax on young consumers, pays a nominal interest rate on money holdings (or taxes money
13 One can think of the workers being endowed with sector-specific skills. If workers were employed in some other sector, their productivity would be considerably lower so that they cannot be paid a wage above their reservation wage. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that industryspecificity contributes more to wage profiles than firm-specificity (see Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) ).
holdings), and finances its deficit by seignorage. We denote by g t the consumption index of the government 14 and by τ t the real aggregate lump-sum tax. Then the government's period budget constraint is
where M t denotes the money stock at the end of period t and I t denotes the nominal gross interest rate.
is the aggregate price index.
From consumption demand of young and old consumers and of the government we obtain the aggregate demand identity (a detailed derivation is contained in the Appendix)
Here, c(.) denotes the propensity to consume of young consumers as a function of the real interest rate. We assume that intertemporal consumption goods are gross substitutes, so that c ≥ 0 (savings are non-decreasing in the expected real interest rate). Sector output demands are the familiar uniformly elastic functions
A sectoral labour market is in equilibrium if y st = st = L which implies that
. Hence, the Walrasian sector wage (w st = p st ) is the same for all sectors and satisfies
Similarly, the Cournot-Nash labour market clearing wage satisfies
Finally, from consumers' preferences we derive the reservation wage of workers (details are again in the Appendix) which is
where
is a strictly increasing function of the inverse of the real interest rate, θ. Hence, the reservation wage (and thereby union wage 14 Specifically, we assume that g t = (
ds)
ρ/(ρ−1) , so that substitution elasticities (and hence demand elasticities) of the government and of consumers are the same. Therefore, there are no elasticity effects of fiscal policy unlike Jacobsen and Schultz (1994) .
demands) go up when inflation rises. The Appendix also shows that a utilitarian sectoral trade union aims to maximize the workers' surplus st (w st − w r t ).
Temporary equilibrium
We are now ready to formulate the temporary equilibrium of this economy in a period t which is defined as an equilibrium of prices, wages, employment and output given expectations about future prices and interest rates and a realization of the sunspot state S t . We impose, for simplicity, the assumption that all sectors coordinate on the same sunspot state B or R, thus focusing on economy-wide booms and recessions and ignoring intersectoral fluctuations. Proposition 3 then implies that unions in all sectors set the same wage w st = w t and that employment, output and prices in all sectors coincide: st = t , y st = Y t = t , and p st = P t .
Suppose that state R prevails in period t. Then from Proposition 3 (a) and (4), a temporary equilibrium (P t , w t , Y t ) with unemployment satisfies the aggregate demand identity (3) and
In the terminology of the literature on disequilibrium macroeconomics (see e.g. Bé-nassy (1982) ), such an equilibrium is of the Keynesian unemployment type since there is an "excess supply" on the labour and on the output market (more precisely, at the prevailing prices firms would want to sell more output and households would want to work more).
If state B prevails in period t, the condition w WE t ≥ zw r t , which is required for a full employment equilibrium Y t = L, turns out to be
Hence, in this case a temporary equilibrium (P t , w t , Y t ) is a Walrasian equilibrium satisfying (3), (6), Y t = L, and w t = P t . It is worth stressing that this equilibrium involves excess vacancies, so that the labour market is, strictly speaking, in disequilibrium. But since prices, wages, output and employment are Walrasian, we refer to this equilibrium as a Walrasian equilibrium. As mentioned before, there can also be an unemployment equilibrium if S t = B as there can be a full employment equilibrium if S t = R. Such equilibria do not change the set of intertemporal equilibria, however, and are therefore neglected.
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Intertemporal equilibrium
Suppose now that the sequences of policy parameters (I t ), (g t ), (τ t ), an initial stock of money M 0 , and a sequence of states (S t ) are given. We are interested in the set of intertemporal equilibria with perfect foresight. Denoting real balances by m t = M t /P t , the government's budget constraint is
Using this identity, the aggregate demand equation (3) can be rewritten as
If S t = R, (5) implies that the real interest rate is a constant:
.
From (7), a Keynesian unemployment equilibrium satisfies
If S t = B, (6) implies a lower bound on the real interest rate:
Note that δ < α since ω is strictly increasing and since z < ρ/(ρ − 1). (7) implies that a (Walrasian) full employment equilibrium satisfies
An intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence (m t , Y t ) t≥0 satisfying the aggregate demand identity (8) together with either (9) (if S t = R) or (10) (if S t = B). Note that, for a given sequence of states S t and fiscal parameters (g t , τ t ), the set of intertemporal equilibria is independent (in real terms) of the initial money stock and of the sequence of nominal interest rates. Thus, money is neutral and superneutral, as is the case in competitive overlapping generations models (see Grandmont (1986) ).
Endogenous business cycles
In this section we show how the model produces endogenous cycles and we suppose the "laissez-faire" case in which the government engages in no fiscal policy (LF):
In this case, the bold curves in Figure 2 illustrate the equilibrium conditions (9) and (10). The line OAC indicates the curve m t+1 = δm t , the line OBD is m t+1 = αm t . The curve OABE is the Walrasian equilibrium condition
which is upward-sloping if consumption in period t and t + 1 are gross substitutes, i.e. c > 0 (for instance, if u is CES with elasticity of substitution greater than 1). Condition (9) is described by the line OB and (10) is described by the curve ABE.
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It can be seen from Figure 2 that there are generically only steady states with full employment. When δ < 1 and α = 1, there exists a unique steady statem which is determinate (stable in the backward perfect foresight dynamics). When α < 1, the only other intertemporal equilibria are inflationary equilibria converging to autarky (m = 0), zero production and zero employment. However, when α > 1, there is scope for equilibrium cycles fluctuating between Walrasian equilibria (WE) in boom states and Keynesian unemployment equilibria (KU) in recession states. More specifically, whenever δ < 1 and α > 1, there may exist cycles between the curves OB and AB. Figure 2 illustrates a (deterministic) cycle of order 7 in which firms coordinate in five successive periods on state R and in two successive periods on state B. Below we will prove an existence theorem for general (k, l) cycles which are defined as deterministic cycles of order k + l with k successive recession periods and imperfect competition, even if there are no menu costs or other nominal rigidities, as has been stressed by Rankin (1992) and Rankin (1995) . Rankin's results are due to the sensitivity of perfect foresight equilibria to the price forecast functions of consumers. These effects play no role in our model, however, since changes of the price in one sector will not affect the aggregate future price level under any reasonable assumption on the forecasting behaviour of consumers. 17 A full employment equilibrium in state S t = R is on the segment BE, but it is not a Walrasian equilibrium since the trade unions set w
CN t
and firms make positive profits. An unemployment equilibrium in S t = B would also be on the line OB, but strictly below B.l successive boom periods.
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All (k, l) cycles turn out to be asymptotically stable in the local backward perfect foresight dynamics, so they are also stable in the dynamics under adaptive learning under some mild assumptions on the forecast function (see Grandmont and Laroque (1986) ). Using the generic arguments of Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) , we also show the existence of non-degenerate stationary sunspot equilibria close to deterministic (k, l) cycles. Though our subsequent analysis is confined to the deterministic cycles, most arguments remain valid for the nearby stochastic cycles as well.
Theorem 1: Assume that the government follows the laissez-faire policy rule (LF) and let δ < 1 < α. Then there exists a (k, 1) cycle if and only if α k δ ≤ 1. Whenever a (k, 1) cycle exists, then there exists also a (k , l) cycle for any 1 ≤ k ≤ k and any l ≥ 1. Any (k, l) cycle is unique, and if a (k, l) cycle is interior, i.e. if the inequality in (10) is strict along the cycle, it is asymptotically stable in the local backward perfect forward dynamics and there exist non-degenerate stationary sunspot equilibria of cardinality k + l close to this cycle.
Theorem 1 is related to Proposition 3 of Azariadis and Smith (1998) who consider a growth model with imperfect information in the credit market, multiple temporary equilibria, and an equilibrium dynamics fluctuating between a Walrasian regime and a regime of credit rationing. Their model has multiple steady states and a large variety of deterministic (and nearby stochastic) cycles spending an arbitrary number of periods in each of the two regimes. In our model, only the number of boom periods is indeterminate, whereas the number of recession periods is bounded above. This is because there is only one steady state in our model which is in the Walrasian regime.
The cycles of our model can exhibit some stylized features of business cycles. First, our cycles exhibit some types of business cycle asymmetries, as illustrated in Figure  3 showing the output time series of a (5,3) cycle. The first period of a recession is characterized by a large fall in output followed (when k > 1) by a gradual climb back to full employment. Moreover when l > 1, troughs are deeper than peaks are tall (i.e. there is negative skewness relative to the mean). Hence, the cycles exhibit steepness and deepness (see Sichel (1993) ). They also exhibit sharpness (see McQueen and Thorley (1993) ) since (when l > 1) growth rate changes at troughs are larger than at peaks. Second, booms are characterized by excess demand for labour, which can be interpreted as vacancies, unlike recessions: thus procyclical vacancies emerge. Third, since real wages are higher in booms than recessions we have procyclical real wages and countercyclical markups. Fourth, (7) implies that inflation is procyclical whenever the (exogenous) sequence of nominal interest rates is procyclical or acyclical.
We now examine briefly the empirical plausibility of our cycles condition. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas intertemporal utility function the conditions αδ < 1 and α > 1 for which cycles exist are equivalent to Since the real reservation wage is w
and since under (LF) the average real gross interest rate along each cycle is 1,
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b is a reasonable measure of the ratio between the real reservation wage and labour productivity.
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A labour share between 0.6 and 0.7 and a replacement ratio between 0.5 and 0.8 suggest that a rough interval of plausible values for b is [0.3, 0.56]. Furthermore, empirical studies report average demand elasticities just below 2 and markup factors between 1.2 and 1.4 (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1995, pp. 260-61) ). Table 1 summarizes the upper and lower bounds for b of the cycles condition (12) for some values of ρ and N compatible with these studies. They are well in accordance with empirically plausible values for b. 20 Labour productivity has been normalized to unity here, but if y = A is the production technology, b must be replaced by b/A in condition (12).
Fiscal policy
The purpose of this section is to show how appropriate fiscal policies can be effective in stabilizing cycles in a standard textbook Keynesian fashion. Our analysis concentrates on deterministic cycles, but we expect similar results for nearby stochastic sunspot cycles as well. We consider two different types of policies, a balanced budget policy in which the government raises spending and taxes during recessions, and an unbalanced budget fiscal policy in which the government runs deficit spending at the beginning of each recession and re-balances the budget at the end of the recession. Both types of policies raise output but do not affect equilibrium prices, the first with a fiscal multiplier of one, and the latter with a fiscal multiplier in excess of one. Later we point out some limitations of these results.
Theorem 1 describes endogenous cycles in the model without fiscal policy. To investigate the efficacy of fiscal policy, we assume the economy has been in a laissez-faire regime up to period t = 0, and has coordinated on a (k, l) cycle for some k, l ≥ 1. At t = 0 the government announces its fiscal policy and we look at the impact of the (perfectly foreseen) policy on the laissez-faire (k, l) cycle. In particular, we assume that the selection of the cycle is invariant to the policy change. We further assume the government (like firms and trade unions) observes S t and we look first at a balanced budget fiscal policy with g t = τ t for all t.
Suppose the laissez-faire (k, l) cycle has been (m * 
(from now on identify i = k + l + 1 with i = 1). A natural Keynesian policy to cure the unemployment in the first k periods of the cycle is to introduce positive government spending during recessions:
In particular, given the laissez-faire (k, l) cycle, suppose for i = 1, . . . , k 
Suppose that
Then it is immediate from (13), (14), (15) and (16) In the textbook fixprice story, the balanced-budget multiplier of one gives way to a multiplier in excess of unity with unbalanced budgets where the government expenditure is not matched by current taxation. A similar outcome can emerge here. Start again from a laissez-faire (k, l) cycle given by (13) and (14) and consider the following policy (suppose k ≥ 2):
(KUB) g t = g > 0 if S t = R and S t−1 = B, and g t = 0 otherwise.
g > 0 if S t = R and S t−k = B, and τ t = 0 otherwise.
Here the government spends g in the first period of a recession and imposes the tax τ in the last recession period. The money supply thus expands at the beginning of the recession and contracts at the end. The restriction τ = α k−1 g means that the contraction exactly matches the expansion since α is the real gross interest rate during recessions (see also the proof of Theorem 3). If g is small then the economy's response is again "fixprice", but now with multipliers (on g) in excess of unity for all periods of the recession.
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Theorem 3: Suppose the same laissez-faire starting point as Theorem 2. Now the government announces in period 0 a Keynesian unbalanced budget fiscal policy (KUB). If g is sufficiently small, then the policy produces a perfect foresight (k, l) cycle in which the output in each period of a recession increases by a multiplier (of g) in excess of unity, and in which nominal prices and wages evolve as under laissez-faire. Theorems 2 and 3 show how Keynesian fiscal policies may produce fixprice responses with textbook multipliers in our model. We should point out that the unit multipliers of Theorem 2 result from the fact that labour supply is perfectly elastic at the reservation wage and inelastic at all other wages, which leads to a horizontal AS curve in the Keynesian regime. With a more general upward sloping labour supply schedule, fiscal policies may induce price changes. We would expect, however, that multipliers are close to the multipliers of Theorems 2 and 3 if the labour supply curve is close to ours.
Of course, policies outside the range of Theorems 2 and 3 may produce different prices from laissez-faire and so different multipliers. In the following we briefly report our results for some policy variations like a non-cyclical policy, excessive government spending, permanently unbalanced budgets or income taxation in the case of a Cobb-Douglas intertemporal utility function. Detailed derivations are contained in Appendix B.
When government spending is the same in all periods (booms as well as recessions), the balanced-budget multiplier is still positive but falls below unity. Government spending during booms produces inflation in all boom periods k + 1, . . . , k + l which raises the reservation wage and thereby the union wage in period k. This leads again to higher inflation in period k and by the same argument to higher inflation and higher wages in all recession periods. The higher wages lead to lower employment and output levels than those obtained with a (KBB) policy in which government spending is raised only during recessions.
Similarly, excessive government spending or permanently unbalanced budgets lead to inflation in recession periods and thus to higher wage demands and higher unemployment in all previous recession periods. On the other hand, it can be shown that even a contractionary policy without government spending but with taxation at the end of a recession raises recession output levels with the same tax multipliers as a (KUB) policy with positive government spending. Thus, it is the deflationary effect of the contraction at the end of the recession which raises output and not the government spending at the beginning.
Finally, if the government levies a proportional tax on (wage and profit) income instead of a lump-sum tax, the reservation wage and thereby the union wage are directly adversely affected by taxation. A higher income tax rate has thus three effects on the recession output levels: a positive aggregate demand effect since a higher tax rate raises aggregate demand (similar to equation (3) in case of a lumpsum tax), a positive inflation effect if the increase of the tax rate is not matched by an increase of government spending (as in case of a lump-sum tax, a budget surplus decreases inflation which leads to lower wages in the previous period), but now also a negative labour supply (reservation wage) effect. Both in case of a (KBB) and in case of a (KUB) policy the negative labour supply effect offsets the two positive effects, and so Theorems 2 and 3 do not extend to the case of an income tax. Instead all multipliers become negative.
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22 See also Molana and Moutos (1991) who show that the positive multipliers of Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988) become zero or negative if there is income taxation.
Conclusions
This paper contains several features which are new relative to the existing literature. First, the firms' coordination problem in our model provides a novel explanation for multiple equilibria under imperfect competition. Second, these multiple equilibria give rise to many endogenous cycles which exhibit several stylized business cycle features. And third, our policy analysis reproduces Keynesian textbook multipliers in a dynamic general equilibrium model without nominal rigidities.
Our multiplicity results use the assumption that sectoral labour markets are separated in the sense that workers can only work for firms in one sector, but nowhere else, and that these workers are represented by one sectoral trade union. It is worth pointing out, however, that the same multiplicity would emerge in an economy with one homogenous labour market and with a single trade union, in which workers can freely move between sectors but face a positive, arbitrarily small cost if they do not work in their home sector.
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All wages in the intermediate range of Figure 1 produce again two equilibria: an unemployment equilibrium in which firms in all sectors coordinate on the Cournotian labour demand of Proposition 1; but there is also a full employment equilibrium in which all firms signal the excess labour demands of Proposition 2 since a lower labour demand of any one firm would not alter employment, output and price levels of all sectors when it is costly for the workers to move to another sector.
The firms' coordination problem can lead to a Walrasian temporary equilibrium even though there is imperfect competition on both the labour and the output markets. In a boom state, they create excess vacancies and behave as if they were pricetakers whenever the wage is below the competitive wage. Trade unions anticipate this behaviour and set the competitive wage since it is the maximal wage consistent with full employment. In a recession state, the outcome is Keynesian unemployment, as would usually be expected in a model with imperfect competition on the output and the labour market. Fiscal policy in both regimes has opposite effects: in the Walrasian regime prices change and output stays constant, and vice versa in the Keynesian regime. 
wherez ≡ w WE /w r . Note that this inequality is not fulfilled atz = 1, but that it is strictly fulfilled atz = ρ/(ρ − 1). Since Φ is strictly increasing on [1, ρ/(ρ − 1)], there exists a unique z ∈ (1, ρ/(ρ − 1)) which fulfills (17) with equality, and anȳ z ∈ (z, ρ/(ρ − 1)) satisfies (17 Consider a consumer supplying labour to some sectorŝ. The consumer maximizes u(C t , C t+1 ) − b t subject to the budget constraints
where ϕ t is a lump-sum tax, π t is the consumer's profit income and µ t is his money savings. Since all young consumers have identical homothetic preferences, the consumption demand for sector s output of all young consumers is
where W n t is the aggregate net (wage and profit) income of young consumers in period t, and c : (0, ∞) → (0, 1) is the propensity to consume, i.e. the fraction of income to be spent on first period consumption as a function of the real interest rate. Since M t−1 denotes the aggregate money savings of the old generation at the beginning of period t, and g t = (
is real government demand, the consumption demand of the old consumers and of the government are
Therefore, total demand for sector s output is
The sector demand of the government can be obtained as the solution of the expenditure minimization problem subject to a given level of real government demand g t .
is aggregate demand. Since firms do not ration demand, sector output y st equals demand D st , and therefore the aggregate net income is W
is the aggregate real lump-sum tax. Using the government's budget constraint M t = M t−1 I t + P t g t − P t τ t , we obtain the aggregate demand identity (3) of the text.
Derivation of the reservation wage (4)
The utility of a young individual in sectorŝ who consumes optimally can be written
, π t is profit income and ϕ t is the lump-sum tax. Thus, all consumers in sectorŝ want to supply labour if the sector wage exceeds the reservation wage of workers, wŝ t > w 
Hence, at any fixed point m 
where P t is the price level in period t, P (9) and (10) when the transition matrix is close to the degenerate transition matrix (the inequalities in (9) and (10) are then also fulfilled since they hold strictly at the interior (k, l) cycle) and when the Jacobian of the equilibrium equations at the cycle is invertible. But this condition turns out to be equivalent to the condition dm t+k+l /dm t | m t =m 1 = ψ (m k+1 ) = 1 which has been shown above.
Finally, in the case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function (c = 0), c is a constant, and the curve OABE in Figure 2 is a vertical line (so that β and ψ are not defined). It is easy to see that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a (k, l) cycle is simply α k δ ≤ 1 (in all boom periods, the cycle satisfies m t =m).
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Finally, we have to show that prices are the same as under laissez-faire. Consider some period t in which S t = B and S t+1 = R, and so M t = M * t (since the budget is balanced during a boom, the money stock at the end of the boom coincides with the laissez-faire money stock). Using m t+1 = m * t+1 + g (since t + 1 is the first recession period), M * t+1 = I t+1 M * t and M t+1 = I t+1 M t + P t+1 g, we obtain easily P t+1 = P * t+1 . For 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 we know M t+i = I t+2 · · · I t+i M t+1 and m t+i = α i−1 m t+1 from which we obtain I t+2 · · · I t+i P t+1 = α i−1 m t+1 −τ we also obtain (24) for i = k. Since (24) also holds for (P * t+1 , P * t+i ) and since P t+1 = P * t+1 , we have P t+i = P * t+i for all i = 2, . . . , k. Equation (24) also implies that the budget is in fact re-balanced in period t + k, and since there is no fiscal policy between t + k + 1 and t + k + l we have M t+i = M * t+i and P t+i = P * t+i for all i = k + 1, . . . , k + l. 2
Appendix B: Policy variations
We assume throughout this appendix a Cobb-Douglas utility function, so that the propensity to consume is a constant c ∈ (0, 1) and the function f is f (θ) = θ 1−c .
Non-cyclical policy
Consider a balanced-budget policy in which government spending is the same in all periods (booms as well as recessions -e.g. the government cannot observe S t ), so g i = τ i = g, i = 1, . . . , k + l. With such a policy it turns out that a higher level of government activity g raises output during recessions, but with a multiplier below unity. In fact, if α k δ ≤ 1, it can be shown that for any g ∈ [0, L), there exists a (k, l) cycle in which recession output levels are
Thus the multiplier is 1 − α −(k+1−i) < 1 and there is partial crowding out during recessions and full crowding out during booms.
Excessive spending
Starting from a (KBB) policy, suppose the government spends "excessively" during a recession period (but unlike the first case does not expend during booms). Specifically consider a laissez-faire (k, l) cycle where k > 1 and a (KBB) policy where g k = L − Y * k and g i = 0 otherwise. From Theorem 2, the only policy impact is to raise Y k from Y * k to L. Now suppose that the expenditure in k becomes slightly excessive: g k = L − Y * k + ε with some small ε > 0. Now the last recession period must involve full employment (in fact, (9) is replaced by m k+1 −g k+1 +τ k+1 = m k+1 ≥ αm k and Y k = L). Hence,
Applying (9) (10) for i = k + 1, . . . , k + l if ε is small enough. On this cycle recession prices (and so wages) are everywhere higher, and recession outputs are lower (the same in the last period k) than under the first (KBB) policy.
Permanently unbalanced budgets
Consider a policy of permanently unbalanced budgets in which the government never re-balances its budget by taxation. Suppose positive government spending during recessions g 1 , . . . , g k ≥ 0 and g i = 0 otherwise, and no taxation τ i = 0 for all i. Then, if g 1 , . . . , g k are small enough, the equilibrium conditions (9) and (10) can be solved for a (k, l) cycle in which for i = 1, . . . , k − 1: and so decreasing in g i+1 , . . . , g k . Similar to the excessive spending policy above, this policy produces inflation in periods i = 2, . . . , k, and therefore raises wages and lowers output in periods i = 1, . . . , k − 1. the higher reservation wage in period i lowers output in period i, but also the higher reservation wages in periods i + 1, . . . , k since they raise inflation in future periods which leads also to higher wage demands in period i. The net effect of the income tax rates on the recession output is unambiguously negative.
Consider 
In equations (28) and (29), the first factor is the negative labour supply effect, while the second factor contains both the positive inflation effect and the positive aggregate demand effect. It can be checked easily that the total effect is negative, i.e. increases in τ decrease output in periods i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
